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The emerging Pacifi c Asian econo-
mies are clearly not immune to the 
current international fi nancial crisis. 
All the major economies remain 
heavily dependent on Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) and export earn-
ings, particularly from the USA. 
The vulnerability of the Pacifi c Asia 
economies is refl ected in the behav-
iour of the regional stock markets, the 
sharp declines in key growth indica-
tors during 2008 and the progressive 
down-grading of projections for 
2009. Particular concerns centre on 
the sharp contractions of growth in 
China and Japan whose economies 
have become the principle drivers 
of regional growth and integration, 
and key links between Pacifi c Asia, 
the West and the rest of the global 
system. The close economic integra-
tion that has come to characterise 
Pacifi c Asia means that recession 
and economic crisis in one economy 
tends to be rapidly transmitted 
throughout the region. This was 
most clearly demonstrated during 
the 1997 crisis and its aftermath.
The 1997 crisis left an indelible 
impression on Pacifi c Asia’s policy 
makers. While the causes and les-
sons of the crisis remain much 
debated, for the major Pacifi c Asia 
economies the fear that it could 
happen again has engendered devel-
opments that have left them much 
better placed to face a major crisis 
than they were in 1997. Indeed, it 
may be that many of the Pacifi c 
Asian economies are better placed 
to weather the current fi nancial 
storms than the West, and perhaps, 
any other part of the global system. 
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Lessons of 1997
After several decades of principally 
trade driven growth the Pacific Asia 
economies received a traumatic shock 
in 1997 when financial crisis brought 
the Asian Miracle to an abrupt halt. 
The severity of the crisis necessitated 
the most seriously affected economies, 
Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand 
appealing to the IMF for major finan-
cial assistance. There seems to have 
been a general expectation amongst 
the Pacific Asia governments that the 
IMF would attach comparatively low 
key conditions to the loans and that 
further assistance would come from 
the USA. In the event, the USA pro-
vided no assistance and backed the 
strict conditions that the IMF attached 
to the rescue packages.2 These 
conditions contrast sharply with 
comparatively generous and gentle 
treatment by the Bretton Woods 
institutions that the Pacific Asia econ-
omies had previously enjoyed. This 
had been particularly evident during 
the crises of the early 1980s (Dixon, 
1995: 213-216). Thus, in 1997 for many 
in Pacific Asia there was a perception 
of having been badly let down, even 
humiliated and exploited, by the West 
and the international agencies. The 
IMF was widely regarded as misread-
ing, mishandling and even deepening 
the crisis. Not least, by insisting on 
the closure of troubled financial 
institutions and corporations. In 
addition, the prominence given to 
liberalisation of ownership in the IMF 
conditionalities led to accusations 
that this was serving the interests of 
international business rather than 
those of the Pacific Asia economies. 
While this should perhaps be seen as 
a coincidence of interest rather than a 
conspiracy (Wade and Veneroso, 1998: 
11-12), the response of the Bretton 
Woods institutions and the USA to 
the crisis brought home to the South 
East Asian economies that the privi-
leged position that they had enjoyed 
during the Cold War had ended: 
 ‘With the end of the Cold War 
the world had been made safe for 
capitalism. Under this situation and 
American sensitivities change and 
there were demands for free access to 
the Asian economies. Almost over-
night the Asian economies ceased 
to be the showpiece of capitalism 
in the Third World and became 
directly at odds with American (in 
particular) interests and ideology.’ 
(Chang Noi (‘Don’t write off the 
Asian economic model just yet’, 
The Nation, 19 August 1998: A5)
In sum, the 1997 crisis funda-
mentally altered the relationship 
between Pacific Asia and the USA. 
Additionally, Japan lost considerable 
standing in Pacific Asia for not speak-
ing loudly enough for the region 
and capitulating to the wishes of 
Washington and the IMF. In contrast, 
‘The Pacific Asia economies 
received a traumatic shock  
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China’s holding of the value of its 
currency and outspoken criticism of 
the IMF gained significant and last-
ing credit.3 While the IMF seemed to 
loose all credibility within the region.
Almost all commentators followed 
the Western line that the crisis was 
entirely a product of domestic short-
comings and an inability to adjust to 
changed external circumstances with 
respect to currency values and, more 
generally, of an increasingly liberalised 
and globalised world. It is difficult to 
deny that there were (and in many 
cases still are) areas of domestic 
regulation, corporate governance and 
banking practices that needed reform 
and more robust regulatory systems. 
Indeed, these views were generally 
accepted within Pacific Asia, particu-
larly by the governments of the most 
seriously affected economies. How-
ever, there was a general resistance 
to the idea that Pacific Asia should 
rapidly Westernise its economic sys-
tems as whole, and open fully to trade, 
investment and foreign ownership. 
Particular exception was taken to the 
implications that this was necessary 
because the various Asian ‘ways’ had 
failed, and fatally undermined the 
region’s long-standing miracle growth. 
Pinning the blame for the crisis 
on domestic shortcomings tended 
to divert attention from the opera-
tion of the global financial system. 
Since the late-1980s this increasingly 
liberalised system has shown marked 
tendencies to volatility and national 
crisis. In Pacific Asia the experience 
of 1997 brought home to policy mak-
ers the vulnerability of their region 
and the ineffectiveness of the Bretton 
Woods System (BWS) in prevent-
ing or addressing crises (Sakakibara 
2003: 232). This awareness has led 
to some significant national and 
regional policy developments.
Policies since 1997
The crisis and its immediate after-
math raised serious issues over the 
economic policies of the Pacific Asian 
economies. Particularly in the most 
seriously affected countries, there 
was questioning of the wisdom of 
open economies, trade and foreign 
investment-led growth, and regional 
integration. Nationalist economic 
rhetoric came to the fore in Malay-
sia and Thailand, though only in 
the former did this translate into 
any major policy shift with the re-
imposition of capital controls. More 
generally, countries began to focus on 
self-insurance against further national, 
regional or global crisis, and the need 
to appeal to the IMF for emergency 
funding. While there has been con-
siderable variation in the sequencing, 
intensity and effectiveness of policies, 
there have been some important com-
mon features. Most significantly, there 
has been emphasis on trade promo-
tion, management of currencies to 
maintaining stability and competitive-
ness, the accumulation of central bank 
reserves, the expansion of welfare 
programmes, a degree of regulatory 
reform, and the expansion of domes-
tic consumption and investment.
Currency management
Since 1997 the successful economies 
have been able to keep their cur-
rencies undervalued and stable, a 
process eased by low domestic infla-
tion.4 This contrasts sharply with the 
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pre-1997 situation when for a number 
of Pacific Asia economies, the failure 
to adjust currency values as the US 
dollar (to which their currencies 
were closely linked) appreciated. 
The resultant loss of competitive-
ness was a major factor in the sharp 
contraction of export markets in 
the immediate pre-crisis period. 
Collignon (2008) has been termed 
the post-1997 Pacific Asian manage-
ment of exchange rates ‘monetary 
mercantilism’ and sees it as the key 
to the expansion of exports and FDI 
inflows, and facilitating regional 
trade integration. However, there are 
down sides to these policies. Most 
obviously, the tensions with major 
trading partners who have accused 
the Pacific Asia countries of unfair 
trading practices, and threatening to 
impose retaliatory tariffs. This has 
been most clearly the case between 
China and the USA. Perhaps much 
more significant, is the impact on 
the development of domestic finan-
cial sectors and the implications 
for generally financial stability.
Collignon (2008) has argued 
that while monetary mercantilism 
develops the real economy it also 
gives rise to shallow, incomplete, 
and fragile financial markets, which 
renders the economy vulnerable 
to financial crisis. This reflects the 
manner in which domestic needs, 
including government borrowing, 
can be financed through current 
account surpluses and reserves (see 
below). There is, for example, little 
development of domestic fixed rate 
bond markets. In addition, surplus 
funds tend to be held in US dollars, 
again diminishing the development 
of money markets involving the 
domestic currency. This situation 
could leave Pacific Asian economies 
extremely vulnerable as governments 
attempt to spend their way out of the 
crises and current account surpluses 
decline or even move into deficit. 
Central bank reserves
The successful management of 
exchange rates has been a major fac-
tor in the generation of large current 
account surpluses. These have facili-
tated the rapid expansion of central 
bank reserves, often under far from 
optimum trading conditions. Since 
1997 the successful Pacific Asian 
economies have sought to accumu-
late reserves as self-insurance against 
major economic crises. Attention has 
focused on the spectacular rise of 
Chinese reserves. Between 1996 and 
2008 these rose by a factor of 16.4, an 
increase in global share from 6.4% 
to 24.4%. However, of the top 13 
holders of reserves in 2008, 7 were in 
Pacific Asia, with the region’s major 
economies accounting for 54.0% of 
the global total. Since 1997, all the 
major economies have significantly 
increased the size of their reserves 
and the number of months of imports 
that they represent (see Tables 1 and 
2). These reserves provide a major 
cushion against the present crisis 
and a source of substantial funds for 
economic stimulation and, if neces-
sary, bank recapitalisation, rescue 
packages and debt write-downs. 
However, before the present crisis 
the accumulation of reserves was 
widely criticised as ‘too much insur-
ance’ (Yuko Hashimoto 2008).5 In the 
case of South Korea, Bowring (2008) 
described as ‘ridiculous’ a situa-
tion where the currency was kept 
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undervalued in order to accumulate 
large reserves in order to defend the 
under-valuation of the currency. 
Regional integration
In the immediate aftermath of the 
1997 crisis, the close trade, invest-
ment and value chain linkages that 
had characterised Pacific Asia were 
seen as its Achilles heel by many 
commentators and the region’s 
politicians and policy makers. There 
was in particular, some serious 
reconsideration of the wisdom of 
the full establishment of the AFTA 
(ASEAN Free Trade Area) and there 
were significant attempts to expand 
trade with the rest of the world, 
notably through proliferation of BLTs 
(Bi-lateral Treaties). The result was a 
slight decline in intra-regional trade, 
before recovering to 1996 levels by 
2002, in the wake of a general (but 
not full – see Booth 2009; Dixon 2009) 
economic recovery. Subsequently, 
while there remain considerable ten-
sions between domestic and regional 
objectives, the development of 
regional, trade, investment and value 
chains have become a major feature 
of governmental policy in Pacific 
Asia. There has been renewed interest 
in the development of ASEAN and a 
proliferation of regional trade agree-
ments6. These include a ‘noodle bowl’ 
of BLTs, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan 
and South Korea) and the ASEAN-
China FTA.7 More significantly, 
there has been general agreement 
over the need for a Pacific Asia 
regional institutional and regulatory 
framework. This is seen as critical 
to deepening of regional economic 
integration which has developed on 
Table 1: Total reserves less gold (US$bn.)
1996 2008
China 107.04 1,738.73 (April)
Japan 216.65 982.80
Taiwan 88.04 275.03 (January)
South Korea 34.04 200.43 declined from a first quarter 
peak of 294.17
Hong Kong 63.81 165.86
Singapore 76.96 165.68 declined from first quarter peak 
of 177.46
Thailand 37.73 104.09 declined from first quarter peak 
of 107.47
Malaysia 27.01 97.37 declined from second quarter 
peak of 125.48
Indonesia 18.25 48.02 declined from first quarter peak 
of 57.02
Philippines 10.03 33.02
Vietnam 1.74 23.82 (October) declined from first 
quarter peak of 26.44
TOTAL 681.30 3,834.85
Note: 1996 is end of year and 2008 is November unless other wise stated. 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, Washington, various years
Table 2: Months of imports that the reserves could finance
1996 2008
China 9.8 20.3
Japan 31.2 16.7
Taiwan 10.6 12.7
South Korea 2.8 9
Hong Kong 4.1 5
Singapore 7.4 7.7
Thailand 7.1 8.2
Malaysia 4.4 8.1
Indonesia 4.9 7.7
Philippines 3.8 6.3
Vietnam 2 4.8
Source: Calculated from IMF International Financial Statistics, Washington, 
various years
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a largely informal basis to a level 
second only to that of the EU.8 
The increasing proportion of trade 
and investment flows that are tak-
ing place within the Pacific Asian 
region are seen as providing a degree 
of insulation from events in the 
wider global economy. These intra-
regional flows involve increasingly 
complex value chains, which take 
advantage of cost, skill, technology 
and regulatory differentials. Thus, 
intra-regional trade flows have come 
increasingly to comprise components 
and part finished goods. However, 
these intra-regional value chains are 
closely connected to extra-regional 
trade, particular through China. As 
China looses export markets, intra-
regional flows will decline sharply, 
thus proving less effective insulators 
from declines in Western markets 
than their high level might suggest.
There is a concern that the devel-
opment of an integrated regional 
production system has been a 
remarkably effective generator of 
growth and stability while markets 
are expanding, but it may make 
the economies involved extremely 
vulnerable when markets contract. 
There is here a basic contradiction 
in the Pacific Asia form of infor-
mal regionalisation and a strong 
argument for the development of 
regional structures and regulations, 
not least with respect to finance.9
Regional financial structures 
and cooperation
In the wake of the 1997 crisis a gen-
eral consensus emerged over the need 
for Pacific Asian financial structures 
that would provide regional financial 
safety nets, greater independence 
from Western money markets and 
the BWS (Dieter, 2006: 5). Positions 
that have been reinforced by the lack 
of progress in reforming the BWS, 
Pacific Asia’s limited voice in the 
protracted discussions over reform, 
and the memory of the blocking 
of attempts to establish an Asian 
Monetary Fund (AMF) in 1997.10 
While there is agreement over 
the need for regional monetary and 
financial structures, there is still 
limited consensus over their exact 
form. There are significant differ-
ences of opinion over management, 
operation, monitoring, linkages 
(if any with Washington and the 
IMF).11 Many of these problems 
reflect questions of regional leader-
ship and on-going Chinese-Japanese 
rivalry (on this see Dieter 2006:19). 
Despite these problems, some very 
significant activity has taken place, 
starting with the Chiang Mai Initia-
tive (CMI) in 2000. This was aimed at 
creating a regional liquidity reserve 
through bi-lateral currency swaps 
involving the ASEAN + 3 group 
(China, Japan and South Korea). This 
has been accompanied by a variety 
of monitoring and surveillance 
measures, particular short-terms 
financial flows, the development 
of the regional bond market and 
co-operation over exchange rates. 
More generally, the region’s bank-
ers have began to exchange views 
and co-operate, something that did 
not happen before the 1997 crisis.
The funds involved in the Chiang 
Mai Initiative have been steadily 
increased, from and initial US$200m. 
to US$71.5bn in 2006. In October 
2008 agreement was reached12 over 
converting the bilateral arrangements 
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into an US$80bn. multilateral fund. 
At the February 22-23 meeting of 
finance ministers held in Thailand, 
this fund was extended to US$120bn. 
(the amount required during the 
1997-8 crisis), with the prospect of a 
further extension to the equivalent 
of 10% of the region’s central bank 
reserves (this would make some 
US$383bn. available). These recent 
developments owe much to the 
current international crisis which is 
focusing attention on the need to get 
a workable regional financial system 
in place. The crisis may also stimulate 
progress in the wider discussions 
over links with India and, in the 
longer run, focus attention on some 
form of currency union. It may be 
that the first step towards the latter 
will be at the sub-regional level with 
the proposed Greater China Currency 
Union involving China, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and, possibly, Singapore.13
Welfare
Since the 1997 crisis there has been 
some significant expansion of wel-
fare systems in Pacific Asia. (Ramesh 
2004; 2002). While there had been 
some development since the early 
1990s, provision remained limited 
outside of Japan and Singapore.14 
Post-1997 developments initially 
reflected the need to cope with the 
immediate distress resulting from 
the crisis, not least in order to main-
tain political legitimacy. However, 
in the longer run the promotion of 
welfare became part of the broader 
moves towards self-insurance 
against further crisis, and an impor-
tant component of the promotion 
of domestic buying power and 
lessening of dependence on export 
markets. This was particular evident 
in Thailand, following the election of 
the Taksin Shinawatra government 
in 2001, but there have also been 
major expansions of provision in 
Malaysia, Taiwan and South Korea, 
and most recently, China (see under 
Policies in the Face of the Crisis). 
These developments also have to be 
seen in the context of major (though 
regionally extremely variable in 
extent and impact) long-term invest-
ment in health, education, training, 
poverty reduction and income 
distribution. While the investment 
in ‘human capital’ has played a 
significant role in the expansion 
of incomes and buying power, the 
economies remain significantly ‘two 
tier’. There is significant segmenta-
tion, particularly with respect to 
welfare, protection of employment 
minimum wage levels and general 
working conditions. Full access to 
these tends to be closely associated 
with employment in large private, 
state and foreign companies. In 
‘While there is agreement over 
the need for regional monetary 
and financial structures, there 
is still limited consensus over 
their exact form’
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contrast, there are large informal 
/ subcontracted / workshop sec-
tors that fall outside all or most 
provisions. In these sectors much 
employment, particularly in the 
context of economic shocks, is main-
tained or rapidly re-established with 
little cost to the state or employers 
because of avoidance of the labour 
codes. Expansion of employment 
protection and welfare into these 
areas could significantly reduce 
this flexibility, however desir-
able and beneficial in other ways 
such developments might be.
The spreading of welfare and 
employment protection may pro-
vide important resilience in the face 
of adverse trading conditions, not 
least by maintaining social cohe-
sion, stability and the legitimacy of 
the government. However, welfare 
expenditure is also an extremely 
effective means of increasing both 
public and private consumption. 
In a number of cases such welfare-
led promotion of consumption 
has been closely linked with pov-
erty reduction measures and the 
direct injections of buying power 
into communities, for example 
through the Thai Village Fund.
Reform of regulation
Since 1997 there has in all the major 
Pacific Asia economies been general, 
if slow reform of corporate govern-
ance and financial regulation. This is 
particularly the case in the banking 
and financial sectors, with changes 
in such key areas as equity-debt 
ratios towards Western norms15 and 
much tighter central bank regulation. 
There has perhaps been a tendency 
to under-report the extent of reform 
in the latter, particularly outside of 
Pacific Asia.16 However, there has 
been far from the wholesale change of 
the sort advocated by the IMF. Banks 
remain closely linked to the state 
and corporations with limited inter-
nationalisation of their activities or 
foreign ownership. In general, long-
term relationships between banks 
and corporations, reinforced by high 
levels of social capital continue to 
characterise the Pacific Asian econo-
mies. For many, these relations are 
at the heart of the region’s success, 
giving as they do more secure credit 
lines and the ability to raise large 
amounts of capital at short notice 
(Jang-Sup Sin, 2002: 18, 31; Jang-Sup 
Sin; Woo-Cummings 2001: 2)17.
Policies in the face 
of the crisis
As the World Bank (December 
2008) has noted, the major Pacific 
Asia economies responded rapidly 
to the current crisis. The lessons of 
the slow and uncertain response in 
1997 of such economies as Thailand, 
compared to that of Singapore, had 
not been forgotten. Though it should 
be stressed, that in general the suc-
cessful Pacific Asia economies have 
significant state capacity for policy 
formulation and implementation. 
That is not to say that they have 
always selected correct policies or 
modes of implication. This was 
amply demonstrated in 1997 and the 
immediate pre-crisis period, and in 
the varied success of the economic 
stimulation and reform programmes 
that characterised Pacific Asia 
during the 1998-2001 period.
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It can be argued that most of the 
major Pacific Asia states have the 
capacity to respond effectively to 
the current crisis. While the accumu-
lated reserves provide the necessary 
funds as well as giving a significant 
‘cushion’ against falls in export 
earnings. All the major Pacific Asia 
economies have implemented pro-
grammes aimed at injecting growth 
and domestic consumption, though 
none have had to launch major 
rescue packages for their banking 
and financial sectors. This reflects the 
dominance of ‘narrow’, domestically 
oriented banking, a general improve-
ment in regulation and practice since 
1997, and (particularly compared to 
1997) low levels of foreign short-term 
debt. However, with the exception of 
Singapore, the Pacific Asia banking 
systems have high levels of non-
performing loans (NPLs), this despite 
major public funded debt reduction 
programmes, such as those operating 
through Thailand’s Financial Restruc-
turing Authority (FRA) and Asset 
Management Corporation (AMC). It 
is certain that the levels of NPLs will 
rise sharply with continued falls in 
export earnings and pressure from 
governments to maintain lending and 
credit lines. Indeed, the Chinese gov-
ernment has made it clear that this 
is expected and provision has been 
made for major recapitalisations and 
debt write-downs (World Bank 2008). 
Most attention has focused on 
Chinese policy responses to the 
current crisis, a reflection of both 
the speed, breadth and scale of the 
intervention, and the importance of 
the Chinese economy to the Pacific 
Asia and global economies.18 Thus 
the sharp decline in Chinese growth 
from 9.1% in 2008 to a projected 5.5% 
in 2009 is a major cause of concern 
not just for China.19 This projection 
is well below the 8% growth that is 
generally seen as necessary, not least 
by Chinese planners, to maintain 
employment and income levels. The 
increase in unemployment to 4.6% in 
December 2008 – almost certainly an 
underestimate and a thirty year high 
was a particular cause of concern 
(Deloitte 2009). However, it may be 
that the projection for 2009 is far too 
pessimistic given the stimulation 
measures that are being taken. In 
November 2008 China announced 
a series of stimulation packages for 
2009-2010 which are likely to amount 
to US$589bn. – some 13% of GDP.20 
These included infrastructure, sci-
ence and technology, health care, 
reduction of income inequality, 
direct injection of funds into rural 
communities, and general welfare 
programmes.21 Some of these are part 
of longer-term programmes, such as 
the 2009-2011 US$394bn. expansion 
of welfare provision (China Daily, 
5 March 2009), which have been 
front loaded as part of the stimula-
tion package. Overall, the impact 
of all these measures on domestic 
consumption could raise Chinese 
growth by 3.6% for 2009, and that of 
South Korea and Taiwan by 0.9% and 
1.2%, respectively, lifting the latter 
economy out of recession (Holland et 
al., 2009). Thus, successful stimula-
tion of the Chinese economy may 
be expected to have a major impact 
on Pacific Asia as a whole. On the 
other hand, if the Chinese measures 
do not succeed, the implications for 
the rest of region are likely to be very 
serious. Encouragingly, the signs 
are that measures are having some 
significant impact with retail sales 
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increasing by 20.8% in November 
and 19.9% in December, and bank 
lending rising by 16.0% in November 
to 19.0% in December (World Bank 
2008). However, for China, as for the 
rest of Pacific Asia, we are still at an 
early stage of the working through 
of the impact of the crisis on export 
and investment regimes. A reflection 
that, unlike 1997, this crisis started in 
the West and spread to Pacific Asia 
and the rest of the global system.
China has made it clear that it is 
prepared to take further measures 
and increase expenditure as neces-
sary.22 The overall aim is to stimulate 
growth by replacing domestic con-
sumption and investment for exports 
and FDI. There is here an attempt 
to reorient the Chinese economy 
towards domestically driven growth 
and reduce dependence on the rest of 
the global system, particular that out-
side of Pacific Asia. However, that is 
not to suggest that China is attempt-
ing at this stage to significantly 
‘de-link’ its economy. China is also 
continuing to manage its currency 
to maintain competitiveness and has 
extended an already vigorous policy 
of export promotion. Key measures 
included reduction of export taxes 
to zero, increased access to credit for 
exporters and FDI, diplomatic and 
BLT initiatives aimed at opening and 
expanding markets, particularly Sub-
Saharan Africa and South America.
Stimulation packages, continued 
currency management, export promo-
tion, and the promotion of domestic 
consumption and investment can 
only provide partial replacement 
for the loss of export earnings and 
FDI, particularly in the short-term. 
In addition, large as they are, central 
bank reserves are finite, and as they 
are drawn on, the prospects of further 
major accumulation is limited under 
prevailing trading conditions. Thus, 
even China and Japan will be hard 
pressed if the recession proves both 
deep and protracted. Indeed, combi-
nations of reduced current account 
surpluses and increased expenditure 
during 2008 reduced the reserves 
of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
South Korea, Thailand and Vietnam 
(see Note 5).23 However, it was for 
a situation such as the present crisis 
that the reserves were accumulated 
in the first place and there is the 
prospect of further assistance from 
the regional fund if necessary. The 
concern is not the exhaustion of 
reserves, but the failure of policies. 
This could lead to all, or most of, 
Pacific Asia sliding into a depres-
sion, almost certainly following the 
path of the rest of the global system.
There are other dangers for Pacific 
Asia that could have global reper-
cussions. Over aggressive currency 
management and trade promotion 
could provoke retaliation by the 
‘Political events that lead to 
a flight of capital are perhaps 
the most likely of the more 
pessimistic scenarios for the 
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USA and spark the sort of trade and 
currency wars that characterised 
the 1930s. The drastic reduction in 
reserves that must result from their 
use and declining current account 
surpluses will reduce the scope for 
the purchases of US Treasury Bonds 
– hitherto the preferred destinations 
for Pacific Asia surpluses. This could 
impinge on American stimulation 
programmes and rebound on the 
Pacific Asia economies in terms of 
further reductions in imports.24
Domestically and regionally there 
are concerns over social cohesion, 
and political stability. The long-term 
stability of the Pacific Asia coun-
tries has been a major ingredient of 
their economic success. A particular 
feature has been the manner in which 
the varied state forms have dealt with 
the destabilising pressures of the 
pluralist tendencies that have flowed 
from economic and social change. 
A critical question is whether stabil-
ity can be maintained in the face of 
a major and protracted recession. 
Particular concerns have been voiced 
over China and, in very different con-
texts, Indonesia and Thailand. Major 
instability in China resulting from 
rapid declines in employment and 
income is by far the greatest cause for 
concern in Pacific Asia (and, perhaps 
for the global system as a whole). It 
may be that whatever the achieve-
ments of the last 40 years, political 
and economic institutions may prove 
too shallow in much of Pacific Asia 
to survive major economic shocks. 
Indeed, political events that lead to 
a flight of capital are perhaps the 
most likely of the more pessimistic 
scenarios for the region’s economies.
Conclusion
The present crisis is reinforcing the 
lessons of 1997 and focusing the 
Pacific Asia economies on the need 
to develop regional structures that 
will ensure a stable environment 
for trade and investment, effective 
financial markets, and aid in the 
prevention of financial crisis. Dieter 
(2006: 4) suggested that in the longer 
run the 1997 crisis has proved to 
be the most important factor for 
the advancement of Pacific Asia 
regionalism (Dieter 2006: 4). It may 
be that the current crisis proves to 
be an even more important stimulus 
towards an integrated, institution-
ally structured, more internally 
driven, and perhaps, China centred, 
regional system. It may be that a 
major consequence of the crisis 
will be a very significant enhanc-
ing of Pacific Asia global position.
The comparatively strong position 
of the Pacific Asian economies in the 
face of the present crisis, is serving 
to focus attention on their post 1997 
policies and longer-term develop-
mental forms. Advocacy of distinctive 
Pacific Asia state-led development 
appeared to be dealt a fatal blow by 
the decade-long Japanese recession 
and the 1997 crisis. Even the emer-
gence of a new generation of Pacific 
Asia growth economies in the shape of 
China and Vietnam failed to rekindle 
the fortunes of the development state 
view. This may well happen with a 
comparatively successful weather-
ing of the current crisis by the Pacific 
Asian economies and what some see 
as the West’s rediscovery of the state 
(see for example Eppler 2009). There 
has been widespread discrediting 
of uncontrolled markets, Western 
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banking systems, corporate models 
and state-business relations. Serious 
debate is now emerging over the need 
for the return of the state as a man-
ager and direct controller of the key 
parts of the economy. In this context, 
consideration should be given to such 
features of the Pacific Asia economies 
as: less than fully open markets and 
financial regimes; high levels of intra-
regional trade and investment; limited 
dependence on the financial sector; 
close-state business linkages; corpo-
rate forms where management and 
ownership remain closely connected; 
corporate borrowing related to inter-
nal growth rather than M&A (Mergers 
and Acquisitions); banks which are 
principally domestically or regionally 
oriented, closely connected with the 
real economy and committed to long-
term relationships with their corporate 
customers; and a general tendency 
towards much less of the short-ter-
mism that runs through much Western 
government and corporate policy. 
Many of these long-standing features 
of the Pacific Asian economies are 
ones that they have been repeatedly 
urged to abandon by the advocates of 
neoliberal orthodoxy, particularly in 
the wake of the 1997 financial crisis.
Finally, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, the comparative strength of the 
Pacific Asia economies and the loss of 
faith in Western forms of regulation 
and state-market relations has given a 
new confidence to the region’s policy 
makers. This is leading them to seek 
their own national and regional solu-
tions to both the current crisis and 
the longer-term problems of regulat-
ing markets. It may be that the crisis 
proves to be a watershed, marking a 
final stage in decolonisation of Asian 
minds (Kalinga Seneviratne 2008). 
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Notes
1 Non-Japanese Pacific Asia – the 10 
ASEAN countries plus China, Hong Kong, 
South Korea and Taiwan.
2 See for example the summaries of condi-
tions attached to IMF loans in Dash (2003: 
274-279).
3 Though China did oppose the proposal to 
establish the Asian Monetary Funds (see 
below).
4 Inflation differentials to USA 
1998-2007
 Singapore  -2.82
 China -1.47
 Thailand 0.23
 Philippines 2.92
 South Korea 5.52
 Indonesia 2.62
 Source: Collignon 2008: 8.
5 A prudent level of reserves is generally 
regarded as the equivalent of 3 months 
imports. As can bee seen from Note 5 
the Pacific Asia levels were all very much 
higher than this.
6 This also reflects the need to increase the 
effectiveness and ‘actorness’ for a wide 
range of extra-regional negotiations and 
to provided some balance against China.
7 This is due to be implemented in 2010 
and will initially involve the ASEAN 6 
countries, with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar 
and Vietnam, joining in 2015.
8 2007 intra-regional trade’s percent-
age of total trade value
 EU  67
 Pacific Asia  59
 NAFTA 45
 Source: Calculated from IMF International 
Financial Statistics, Washington, various 
years.
9 This situation is complicated by the 
opposition of the USA to Pacific Asia 
regionalism. Washington’s promo-
tion of APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation) should be seen as a very 
clear attempt to undermine Pacific Asia 
initiatives.
10 While the AMF proposal was by no 
means fully thought through and needed 
considerable refinement, it is difficult to 
avoid the conclusion that the USA did not 
want a to loose the leverage that could be 
exerted through the IMF to force open the 
Pacific Asia economies. 
11 The position adopted under the Chiang 
Mai Initiative is that permission has to 
sought from the IMF before any county 
can access the regional fund. While this is 
widely seen as little more than diplomatic 
formality, it is a continuing source of 
dissent, which the 19-21 February 2009 
meeting of finance ministers failed to 
dispel.
12 At a sideline meeting during the 7th Asia-
Europe Meeting (ASEM) held in Beijing 
24-25 October 2008.
13 The Chinese Renminbi has become an 
increasingly important (though still minor) 
element in the currency baskets used by 
Pacific Asia economies and is widely used 
in Mongolia and North Korea.
14 Welfare provision has development in 
Pacific Asia under very varied regimes, 
such that there is little to suggest any 
direct casual link with democratisation or 
civil society.
15 Before the crisis average debt/equity 
ratios in Thailand were between 2:1 and 
3:1 against the Western norm of 1:1. By 
2002 they had fallen to 1.5:1 (Kasian 
Tejapira, 2002: 325).
16 Though there are many in the West who 
doubt whether the Asian reforms of regu-
lation and practice have been sufficient to 
ensure sufficient resilience in the face of a 
major crisis (Economists, 30 June 2007). 
17 For a counter view see Regnier 2000: 17.
18 Though this should not be allowed to 
detract from the scale of some of the 
other interventions. 
 Between 1 January and 16th March 2009 
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the following stimulus were announced 
(US$bn.):
 Indonesia   4.16 March 
 Malaysia  16.0  March 
 South Korea  4.2 March 
 Taiwan  9.1 February 
 Singapore  13.7 January
 Thailand  3.3 February
 Philippines  7.2 February
 The Malaysia package is particularly 
impressive, the equivalent of 9% of 
GDP, this in addition to the US$1.8bn. 
announced in November 2008 (Financial 
Times 11 March 2009). In contrast, late in 
December 2008, Vietnam announced a 
stimulation package of US$1bn.
19 This projection was made by Holland et 
al. in February 2008, earlier projections by 
the World Bank and IMF gave 7.7% and 
6.7% respectively (World Bank 2008).
20 Subsequent announcements could take 
this as high as US$900bn. Though there 
may be some significant double counting 
in the various Chinese announcements 
(see ‘Troubled tigers’, The Economist 31 
January 2009).
21 Many of these measures are also aimed 
at promoting social cohesion and what is 
officially termed the ‘harmonious society’. 
22 See: People’s Bank of China ‘State treas-
uries urged to serve economic growth’, 
December 2008, http://www.pbc.gov.cn/
english//detail.asp?col=6400&ID=1229: 
and the interview with Wen Jiabao, 
Financial Times, 2 February 2009. 
23 It is unclear to what extent Chinese 
reserves have been diminished late in 
2008 by an unwise incursion into equities 
(Financial Times, 16 March 2009.
24 This would of course bringing some 
adjustment to the global imbalances that 
appear to lie at the heart of the current 
crisis.
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